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Abstract
Economic theory predicts that consumption and investment choices should not depend on the
source of the budget. We test this assumption through conducting two experiments. In both experi-
ments, we divide participants into two groups: those that obtain an endowment through a windfall and
those that obtain the same amount through completing a physical effort task. We show that individ-
uals in the hard-earned group make significantly less risky and more patient choices than individuals
in the windfall group. We corrobate the existence of source-dependent decision rules through sur-
veying a large and representative sample of individuals. Our findings are consistent with versions of
mental accounting theory where mental accounts are linked to source of income. We conclude that
consumption and investment behavior are source-dependent, unlike what is assumed by economic
theory.
Keywords: house money, risk preferences, time preferences, windfall gain.
JEL codes: C91, D14, E21.
Thanks to University of Aberdeen in Scotland and Sogang University in South Korea for providing access to their exper-
imental labs. Thanks to Syngjoo Choi, Euan Phimister, Joseph Swierzbinski, seminar audiences, and in particular to Bertil
Tungodden for valuable comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from University of Aberdeen (Principal’s
fund) and the University of Bergen (Småforsk).
yUniversity of Bergen. Email: hans.hvide@econ.uib.no. Hvide is also affiliated with CEPR and the University of Aberdeen.
zUniversity of Aberdeen. Email: jhlee@abdn.ac.uk.
1
1. Introduction
Almost all economic decisions have intertemporal and risk aspects, whether it involves purchasing a
car, investing in stocks, or finding a spouse. Standard economic theory attempts to understand such
decisions assuming stable preferences and a budget constraint, where decisions can depend on the size
of the budget, but the source of the budget, whether obtained through inheritance, a tax break, overtime at
work, should not play a role (as long as expectations about future income are held fixed). The purpose of
this paper is to provide new evidence on whether source of income affects risk and intertemporal choices.
Why should source of income matter? Folk wisdom, expressed by the proverb “easy come easy
go”, suggests that money obtained easily, through for example inheritance or a lottery win, is allocated
differently, less cautiously and less patiently, than money that is hard-earned.1 Field evidence point in
the same direction; Souleles (1999, 2002) shows that the marginal propensity to save among households
was low for the Reagan era tax cuts and refunds. Without a control group, however, it is difficult to
know whether other mechanisms such as liquidity constraints or wealth effects played a role. One the-
oretical tradition consistent with source of income effects on investment behavior is mental accounting
theory (e.g., Camerer et al, 2004, Thaler, 2008), where income is split into mental accounts, such as
daily expenditures, savings, entertainment, donations, and individuals optimize locally, i.e., inside these
accounts. Of course, if income is split optimally into mental accounts, there is no discrepancy between
mental accounting theory and standard economic theory. A version of mental accounting theory consis-
tent with source of income effects is when the allocation into mental accounts is linked to the source of
the income (Thaler, 1999), as when windfall gains are invested more risky than hard-earned gains.2
We wish to test in a controlled environment whether source of income affects investment behavior.
The null hypothesis, supported by economic theory, is that source of money has no effect. The alternative
hypothesis, supported by evidence and by mental accounting theory, is that individuals are less restrained
with windfall money than hard-earned money; more willing to accept risks and more impatient.
To test whether source of income affects investment behavior, we run two separate experiments (on
1Literature is awash with examples of the human tendency to spend money in a source dependent manner. An early example
is from the New Testament, Luke 15, where the younger son of a wealthy man insists on getting his share of inheritance while
the father is still alive. The father, unwisely as it turns out, gives in, and the son goes on to squander the fortune on “wild
living”. Thaler (1999) writes “A few years ago I gave a talk to a group of executives in Switzerland. After the conference my
wife and I spent a week visiting the area. At that time the Swiss franc was at an all-time high relative to the US dollar, so the
usual high prices in Switzerland were astronomical. My wife and I comforted ourselves that I had received a fee for the talk
that would easily cover the outrageous prices for hotels and meals. Had I received the same fee a week earlier for a talk in New
York though, the vacation would have been much less enjoyable.”
2In some formalizations, mental accounting theory has been bridged with loss aversion theory, but the focus has been on
different behavioral responses to losses and wins, rather than the source of wins, see e.g., Heath & Soll (1996) or Barberis &
Huang (2001). See also Lee (2015).
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two distinct subject groups). In both experiments, subjects are split into two groups; one group receives
an endowment through a windfall gain, and the other group earns the same amount through completing
a tedious task (e.g., potato peeling). A key point in the experimental design is that we attempt to pay
the “hard-earned” group reasonably well per unit of time, but not excessively; we wish to avoid the pay
being perceived as being (partly) a windfall. We then instruct subjects to choose between lotteries that
differ along the risk and intertemporal dimensions, using procedures proposed by Holt & Laury (2002)
and Andreoni et al. (2013). For risk taking, the Holt-Laury procedure ranks alternatives in degree of
riskiness and subjects choose a switching point; subjects with a higher switching point take less risk. For
intertemporal allocation, the Andreoni-Sprenger procedure ranks alternatives on an intertemporal budget
line in terms of degree of patience, and subjects choose one of the alternatives.
The main result of the paper is that the windfall group makes significantly more risky and less patient
choices than the hard-earned group. The differences are large; for example, three quarters of subjects in
the windfall group accept an actuarially fair bet in the first experiment, while the corresponding number
for the hard-earned group is one quarter. Assuming common within-group preferences of a particular
form allows us to structurally estimate risk and time preferences. This estimation procedure yields risk
aversion and discount factor estimates that are significantly different for the windfall and hard earned
money groups. We also investigate whether there is heterogeneity of treatment effects depending on, for
example, gender and average daily spending or self-reported measures of risk and time preferences. We
find no major heterogeneity of treatment effect. For example, we find a similar source dependency across
gender.
To further substantiate whether subject behavior is due to source of income effects, we asked the
experimental subjects, after completing the experiment, about their preferred choice in a series of hypo-
thetical choice situations involving either a windfall gain or a hard-earned gain. Subjects reported being
much more likely to make risky and impatient choices if they receive a windfall (lottery win) than if the
same amount of money is hard-earned (part-time job in a grocery store). The effects appear large; for
example a question in the survey asks subjects to choose between a nice dinner in a restaurant or top-up
a travel card. With earned money, 70.5 percent of subjects said they top-up a travel card. With endowed
money, the corresponding number was 20.5 percent. The choices do not appear to be very different when
the size of the hypothetical budget is altered.
The experiments and the first survey were run on an undergraduate student population. To assess
whether source of income effects are present in the broader population we ran a similar survey on a
representative sample of 1000 adults. Also in this survey we find very strong differences across the two
groups; individuals that were exposed to the windfall “treatment” make more risky and impatient choices
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than individuals that were exposed to the hard-earned treatment. Based on these results, we conjecture
that source of income effects documented in the experiments extend beyond the university undergraduate
population.
Our work is related to several strands of the literature. First, motivated by Friedman’s permanent in-
come hypothesis, a large literature has studied consumption choices following windfall gains in the field.
One example is the work by Souleles (1999, 2002) cited above. Other studies suggest a link between
source of income and which budget the income is allocated into, consistent with mental accounting as
expressed in Thaler (1999). For example, Kooreman (2000) shows that spending on children clothing
is much more sensitive to changes in child allowance than to other income sources, and Beatty et al.
(2011) use regression discontinuity methodology to show that the UK winter fuel payment, a cash grant,
is disproportionately spent on heating; examples of the so-called flypaper effect in public finance (Ja-
coby, 2002). In contrast to this body of work, we show in a controlled environment that subjects make
less risky and more patient decisions with hard earned money than with windfalls, holding the transfer
to each group constant.
Second, recent experimental work investigates whether subjects are less “cooperative” with money
obtained after an effort task than with money received through a windfall. Cherry et al. (2002) shows that
subjects playing a dictator game are less generous with money obtained after a mental task (answering
10 out of 17 GMAT questions correctly) than with a windfall gain. Spraggon & Oxoby (2009) finds the
opposite result in a public good game, and Cherry et al. (2005) find no effect in a public good game.3
This literature has shown that social preferences are source dependent. We complement this literature by
looking at source dependence in other preference domains.
Third, one of the oldest findings of behavioral economics is the endowment effect, where individuals
value objects more highly when they possess them than when they do not (Knetsch, 1989, Camerer et al.,
2004). Cardenas et al. (2014) and Morrison & Oxoby (2013) study the effect of the timing of windfalls
on risk and intertemporal decisions, the idea being that subjects may value endowments received weeks
before the experiment differently than an endowment received immediately before the experiment (one
issue with this empirical strategy is that subjects in the early endowment group may spend it prior to
coming to the lab). Cardenas et al. (2014) does not find a difference in risk taking among the early and
late recipient groups. Morrison & Oxoby (2013) finds that the group that receives the endowment prior
3Cappelen et al. (2010) find that people think it is more fair to have inequality if inequality is caused by level of effort rather
than luck. Corgnet et al. (2014) show that trading volume in an experimental asset market is higher with windfall money than
with earned money. However, due to the complicated strategic interaction in this setting, it is difficult to relate it to individual
preferences; more active trading may be due expectation of higher (risk-adjusted) returns rather than individuals becoming
more tolerant to risk per se. We avoid strategic interaction in order to isolate source of budget related determinants of individual
behavior.
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to the date of the experiment (one week before) exhibit more patient choices than those that receive the
endowment on the date of the experiment. In contrast, we study the effect of how the endowment is
earned, through a windfall or through hard work, and hold constant the timing of transfer.4
Fourth, a large experimental literature studies whether individuals react differently to gains or losses
in experiments. For example, Thaler & Johnson (1990) shows that prior gains leads to riskier choices than
prior losses (“house-money effect”), while this pattern can be reversed if the subjects get the opportunity
to bet on long shots that can make them break even (“break-even effect”). Common for these experiments
is that wealth or income effects may explain at least part of the behavior. In contrast, we consider a setting
where the two groups have the same initial endowment, and compare the effect of the endowment being
received through a windfall or through hard work.
Fifth, a long tradition in accounting and finance purports that managers tend to be myopic in their
investment decisions, and thereby waste long-run shareholder value. Several explanations have been
offered, including takeover pressure (Stein, 1988), equity-based compensation contracts (Kaplan &
Minton, 2011), and earnings management (Stein, 1989). Our findings suggests that one reason for my-
opia might be imperfect managerial response to cash flow windfalls. For example, Andrén & Jankensgård
(2015) show that oil industry firms that were not financially constrained increased their cash flow - in-
vestment sensitivity after the mid 2000s windfall due to increased oil price, and attributes this to agency
problems, much along the lines of Jensen (1986) free cash flow theory. Investment decisions that are
source dependent is an alternative, and to our knowledge novel, explanation of this finding.
2. Experimental design
We ran two experiments, one on risk choices and one on intertemporal choices. Each experiment con-
sisted of two stages. In the first stage, subjects were split into two treatment groups; the “windfall group”
and the “hard-earned group”. The windfall group received an endowment simply by showing up, and the
hard-earned group earned the same amount through peeling potatoes or making envelopes. The partic-
ipants in the hard-earned groups were given a performance target (peeling 25 potatoes or making nine
envelopes), and received the endowment if they meet the target within 30 minutes.5 A key point in the
experimental design is that the “hard-earned” group gets reasonably well paid, 5000 KRW in risk choice
4While the analysis of timing of windfalls is their main focus, Morrison & Oxoby (2013) contains a pair of treatments
where the 50 subjects either received USD 40 through a windfall, or after completing 10 out of 20 GRE questions correctly (all
subjects completed the task and received USD 40). Morrison & Oxoby (2013) do not find a difference in the elicited discount
rates between these two groups. We suspect this could be because subjects did not necessarily find correctly answering 10 GRE
questions for USD 40 “hard work” but rather a windfall.
5In one session in HL experiment, eight subjects were given a corn-plucking task, where the subjects manually extract any
corn kernel from two ears of corn.
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experiment or £10 in intertemporal choice experiment, but not excessively; we wish to avoid the pay
being perceived as being (partly) a windfall. 5000 KRW corresponds to about half-day of expenditure
for the subjects and £10 corresponds to about one day of expenditure for the subjects.6 The relatively
short working time (35 minutes in total) was chosen to avoid any fatigue that could lead to a bias.
In the second stage, we investigated whether there were differences in risk and intertemporal choices
between the two treatment groups. The risk choices experiment is based on Holt & Laury (2002) and
the intertemporal choice experiment is based on Andreoni et al. (2013). For risk taking, the Holt-Laury
procedure ranks alternatives in degree of riskiness and subjects choose a switching point; subjects with
a higher switching point take less risk. For intertemporal allocation, the Andreoni-Sprenger procedure
ranks alternatives on an intertemporal budget line in terms of degree of patience, and subjects choose
one of the alternatives.7 We analyze whether there are significant differences in choices between the two
treatment groups.
2.1. Subject pool
The participants in the experiments were recruited from the student population of University of Aberdeen
in Scotland (the intertemporal choice experiment) and from Sogang University in South Korea (the risk
choice experiment). All participants were recruited with the same set of procedures. They were invited
to take part in a research project but were not told the purpose of the experiment. They were promised a
minimum earnings and told a possible maximum earnings from participation. Participants were asked to
pick three alternative sessions, and were randomly allocated between sessions.
Participants in the risk choice experiment were paid in cash at the end of experiment whereas partic-
ipants in the intertemporal choice experiment were told that they would receive money by online bank
transfer and were only allowed to participate if their bank account allowed for this.8
We ran 14 sessions with in total 144 subjects; 83 in the risk choice experiment and 61 in the intertem-
6Converting the 5000 KRW or £10 to an hourly rate is difficult because subjects also spent time coming to the experiment,
listening to instructions etc. In addition to the 5000 KRW or £10 they also received a participation fee of 10000 KRW (= approx.
$10) and £3 (= approx. $4.5), respectively. The participation fee in the risk experiment is larger than that of intertemporal
allocation experiment in the UK. The larger participation fee was paid in risk experiment foremostly in order to match typical
earnings in SEE Lab (Sogang Experimental Economics Laboratory) and encourage participation.
7Andreoni et al. (2013) is a discrete choice version of the original Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). Andreoni & Sprenger
(2012) used a computer interface to allow subjects to choose any alternatives (i.e., allocations) on an intertemporal budget
line. As our experiments involved a physical task, using a room with computers, like a laboratory, was less practical, and we
therefore opted for a paper-based experiment using a discrete choice set rather than a continuous choice set as in Andreoni &
Sprenger (2012).
8In the intertemporal choice experiment, we used the faster payment system. This is an electronic payment system which
allows people to receive money within a few hours. Although almost all current accounts in the UK retail banks automatically
allows receiving faster payment, the participants were still asked to check on the UK payment council and give us confirmation
(http://www.paymentscouncil.org.uk/resources_and_publications/sort_code_checker).
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poral choice experiment. Table A1 summarizes the sociodemographic characteristics of the risk choice
experiment (Panel A) and for the intertemporal choice experiment (Panel B). Within each experiment,
the treatment groups are reasonably balanced, with the exception of the “Smoking”, “Other Participants”,
and “Confidence” variables in the risk choice experiment.9 In the analysis we take into account this pos-
sible non-randomness in recruitment, but find no significant effect except for the “Confidence” variable.
Understandably, subjects who were not confident of receiving payments were less risk-averse, consistent
with previous literature. For example, Holt & Laury (2002) find that the subjects were significantly less
risk-averse in the hypothetical experiment than in the real experiment. It is plausible that subjects who
do no believe they would be paid may view the experiment as hypothetical.
2.2. The experiments
At the beginning of the experiment, participants in both the windfall group and the hard-earned group
were provided with an instruction sheet, which gave a complete description of the decision-making
problems and how earnings are decided from subject’s decision-making, as described below. Participants
in the windfall group were told that they were given some money simply for showing up and that they
were going to participate in the next phase (the decision-making problem) with this money. Similarly,
participants in the hard-earned group were also told that the experiment consisted of two stages, where
the first stage consisted of earning a starting payment from a real physical task and the second stage
involved decision-making problem phase with their starting payment.10 After the instruction session, the
participants in the windfall group went on to the decision-making problem whereas the participants in
the hard-earned group performed a physical task and earned the starting payment before they went on
to the decision-making problem. After five minutes practice time, the hard-earned group would earn a
starting payment of £10 or 5000 KRW by either peeling 25 potatoes (intertemporal choice experiment)
or making nine envelopes (risk choice experiment), respectively, during in 30 minutes. They were told
that the completed work would not be wasted but would be used for real.11 After the production phase,
the experiment proceeded as for the windfall group. There was only one participant (in risk choice
experiment) who failed meet the target.
In the risk choice experiment, the decision-making problem asks whether subjects want to keep their
9The participants in the risk preferences experiment is older on average (23.5 years) than in the intertemporal choice
experiment (20.9 years). The ‘Korean age’ is different to western reckoning. In Korea, newborns start at the age of 1 year and
everyone gets a year older on New Year’s day regardless of their birthdays. Thus, Korean age is always either one or two years
older than Western age.
10For a full set of instructions, please see the online Appendix.
11The initial plan was to have the same physical task (peeling potatoes) in both experiments, but this turned out infeasible
because the second experiment was conducted in South Korea in the summer, when the weather conditions are very hot and
humid, which cause vegetables to rot. Therefore the envelope task was used in the second experiment.
7
initial endowment or participate in a lottery with it. The lottery pays either 11000 KWR (equivalent to
$11) or 200 KRW (equivalent to $0.2). The subjects make nine decisions, where each decision differs in
the probability of receiving favorable outcome. Subjects with a higher switching point take less risk. At
the end of experiment, one of nine decisions is randomly selected for actual payments and the subjects
are paid in cash.12
In the intertemporal choice experiment, the procedure asks subjects to allocate their initial endow-
ment between two points in the future, t and t + k, subject to the intertemporal budget constraint,
xt +
xt+k
p
= m (1)
where m is the initial endowment, xt is the earlier payment, xt+k is the later payment, and p is the
interest rate, where p 2 {1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7}. There were two earlier payment dates (day
of experiment, 6 weeks after the experiment) and three later payment dates (6 weeks, 12 weeks and 18
weeks after the experiment). The gist of the experiment is to, for varying interest rates, ask subjects to
allocate their budget m into payment at date t or date t + k. Subjects that tend to allocate more to date
t+k exhibit more patience. In the experiment, subjects faced a total of 36 different intertemporal budget
constraints and made 36 intertemporal decisions. One of these decisions is randomly selected for the
actual payment.
One of the most important aspects of intertemporal choice experiment is to equalize the credibility
of payments over different dates. In order to do so, previous experiments have used ‘front-end-delay’
payment where the earliest payment date is anything from a day after the experiment to as long as a
month. This is done in order to remove the subject’s temptation to choose immediate payment, simply
because the payments in a distant future do not seem credible.13 Therefore, we paid participants by faster
payment, which is an electronic payment system which allows people to receive money within a few
hours. Faster payment would not only equalize the credibility of payments over different dates, but also
maintains the immediacy of payments that characterize the present-bias. To minimize any unexpected
difference in transaction costs between two dates, two equally sized participation fees of £1.50 are also
paid. One participation fee was added to the earlier date earnings and the other participation fee was
12In the original Holt-Laury procedure, the participants face a choice between two uncertain lotteries. We chose one certain
and one uncertain lottery to avoid forcing subjects to participate in the lottery with their own money. A sure gain option
could lead to certainty bias (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In a separate experiment (not reported) at the same university, we
replicated the standard Holt & Laury (2002) experiment using another subject sample from the same university. Here we found
no evidence of a certainty bias.
13Another solution is to post the payment (e.g., cheque) where the mail delivery was usually made after the day of the
experiment. However, as discussed in Dohmen et al. (2012), a potential drawback of delaying the earlier date payment is losing
immediacy of payment. This can be a problem, especially if the experiment is designed to test the present-bias.
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added to the later date earnings. This prevents, for example, a subject choosing a corner solution simply
because they prefer to receive a single payment rather than two separated payments.
3. Results
3.1. Risk choices
In each decision-making problem, the subjects were given a table of nine decision rows. In each decision
row, the participants are asked to choose between the riskless Option A and a lottery, Option B. The
lottery in decision row 1 is the most risky and the lottery in decision row 9 is the least risky. The degree
of risk-taking is inferred from the switching point, i.e., the row where a subject switches from choosing
Option A to choosing Option B.14 The following figure plots the choices made by the two groups.
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE)
The figure displays the proportion of times Option A (the riskless choice) was chosen at each deci-
sion row for each group. The horizontal axis is the row number and vertical axis is the percentage where
Option A was chosen. A risk-neutral individual would switch to Option B at row five, as indicated by
the green line. The blue line displays choices for the windfall money group and the red line displays the
choices for the hard-earned money group. The difference between the two groups is striking; the propor-
tion of Option A in the windfall group drops markedly between row four and five while the individuals
in the hard-earned group switches from Option A to Option B much more gradually. Many subjects
in the hard-earned group chose riskless choice even when the expected value of the lottery becomes
considerably larger than retaining money.
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)
We now collect one number from each individual, their switching point si, and regress si on treatment
status, Ti, where Ti = 1 for the hard-earned group and 0 if not, and other characteristics. Table 1
displays the regression results. The first column reports the results of a regression of si only on Ti, i.e.,
a simple t-test between the treatment groups, and the other columns add individual sociodemographic
characteristics. Across the columns, being in the hard-earned group is associated with about 1.6 higher
switching point, i.e., less risky choices. We note that self-reported willingness of risk-taking from the
survey is associated with risk choices in the experiment. Subjects who are generally more risk-seeking
14Two participants out of 82 made inconsistent choices and were excluded from the analysis. Further two subjects are also
dropped because they did not complete the survey questions, leaving a sample of 78.
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are also more risk-seeking in the experiment.15 In the regression, we take into account possible non-
randomness in recruitment, but find no significant effect except for the “Confidence” variable. There
were seven subjects who said they were not confident of receiving payments and it is plausible that
they may view the experiment as hypothetical. These subjects were significantly more risk-seeking on
average, which is consistent with previous literature; Holt & Laury (2002), for example, find that the
subjects were significantly more risk-seeking in the hypothetical experiment than in the real experiment.
We also investigate whether there is heterogeneity of treatment effects (i.e., hard-earned group) be-
tween, for example, gender, average daily spending, age, subject’s major or self-reported measures of risk
preferences. We find no heterogeneity of treatment effect except for trust and exercise; earning money
has a significant negative effect on subject’s switching point for subjects who easily trust strangers as
compared to subjects who do not trust strangers (i.e., a weaker positive effect from earning money).
Please see Appendix Table A3 for regression results.
To structurally estimate degree of risk aversion, we adopt the procedure of Harrison & Rutstrom
(2008). Assume that the subjects have CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility functional form,
U(x) = x1 r (2)
where r is the coefficient of CRRA. A higher r is associated with higher risk aversion. Furthermore, we
assume that the CRRA coefficient r is determined by the following linear equation,
r^ = r^0 + r^1Ti (3)
where the treatment Ti =1 if hard-earned money, and Ti = 0 if windfall money. We assume that errors
are normally distributed and structurally estimate r^0 and r^1using maximum likelihood. 16
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)
Table 2 reports the structural estimation results. The first column of Table 2 displays the estimation
results from Luce’s (1959) choice probabilistic ratio from the full sample of observations. The average
CRRA coefficient was 0.02 in the windfall money group, i.e., close to risk neutral, and 0.45 in the hard-
earned group, i.e., risk-averse. Earning money increases the CRRA coefficient by 0.43 on average and
15 The sociodemographic controls that is statistically significant (at the 10% level) are exercise, postpone, and trust. Exercise
is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a subject exercise regularly, and zero if not, and Postpone is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if a subject often postpone duties, and zero if not. Trust is the degree of trusting strangers in general.
Consistent with previous literature (e.g., Anderson and Mellor, 2008; Barsky et al., 1997; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen et
al., 2005), being a female or non-smoker is associated with more risk averse choices, but in our case not statistically significant.
16Please see Appendix for full description of econometric method.
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the difference is statistically significant (p  0.01).17
Column (2) - (4) of Table 2 are robustness checks. Column (2) and Column (3) in Table 2 is the
robustness check on the unbalanced variables between the treatment groups. Column (2) in Table 2
displays results excluding 7 subjects who said in the survey that they were not confident that they would
receive the payments described in the instructions. Interestingly, 6 out of these 7 subjects were from
the windfall group, suggesting that subjects were more skeptical about receiving payments when they
easily obtained money. Column (3) of Table 2 displays results excluding 32 subjects (21 subjects in the
windfall group and 11 subjects in the hard-earned group) who personally knew any other participants
within the same or previous sessions. Consistent with the regression results, the source of income effect
was still robust in both Column (2) and (3). A half of the subjects have an experience in participating
economics experiments before participating ours. Column (4) of Table 2 displays results excluding these
39 subjects but the results remain same.18
3.2. Intertemporal choices
In each decision-making problem, there are six options on a budget line defined by (1) and subjects pick
their most-preferred option. The options are ranked in degree of patience, where Option 1 is the least
patient option (i.e., allocation of all endowment into the earlier date) and Option 6 is the most patient
option (i.e., allocation of all endowment into the later date).19 The following figure gives an overview of
the choices made by the two groups.
(FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE)
Figure 2 compares the mean allocation to the later date against the interest rate for the windfall group
(blue line) and the hard-earned group (red line). As expected the slopes of both lines are increasing;
both groups increase their allocation to the later date as the interest rate increases. Again the difference
between the two groups is striking: for most interest rates, the mean number of allocation to the later
date is higher in the hard-earned group than in the windfall group, suggesting that subjects are more
patient in the hard-earned group. Clearly source of income effects are not all-powerful: when the interest
17The estimated CRRA coefficient in the hard-earned group is higher than that of Holt & Laury’s (2002) 0.27 and the
estimate in the windfall group is substantially lower than this. It is interesting to observe “risk-neutrality” in the windfall group
as the “risk-aversion” is often observed in laboratory experiments using Holt-Laury estimation.
18For example, Guillen and Veszteg (2012) finds that previous experience in participating experiment could lead to selection
bias (e.g., males are more likely to participate again), but we find no evidence of similar selection bias in our sample.
19As in Andreoni & Sprenger (2012) and Andreoni et al. (2013) we dropped two subjects who do not have any variation
with their choices because parameter estimation for these subjects is not feasible. The results remain same if these two subjects
are included.
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rate becomes very high, most subjects in both groups prefer the most patient option. For example, the
fraction of Option 6 (i.e., most patient) was chosen when the daily interest rate is one basis point or
higher is 84.5% in the windfall group and 91.7% in the hard-earned group.
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)
Table 3 displays the regression results of the allocation to the later date, li, on treatment status,
Ti, where Ti = 1 for the hard-earned group and 0 if not. The first column reports the results of the
regression of li only on Ti, i.e., a simple t-test between the treatment groups, and the other columns
add individual sociodemographic characteristics. Across the columns, being in the hard-earned group
is associated with about £2.40 more of the budget allocated to the later date, i.e., more patient choices.
Somewhat surprisingly self-reported degree of patience is associated with less patient choices in the
experiment, but not statistically significant.20
Understandably, the participants who have some specific reason for their decision-making other than
monetary rewards are less patient as the majority of reasons were the urgent need of money. We also
investigate whether there is heterogeneity of treatment effects (i.e., hard-earned group). We find no
major heterogeneity of treatment effect except for, for example, "Earned  Course" interaction term.
For example, we find that earning money has a significant negative effect on the later date allocation for
subjects whose major is business school related course of degrees as compared to non-business school
students (i.e., a weaker positive effect from earning money).21
The Andreoni-Sprenger procedure allows us to structural estimation of a discount rate, present-bias
and utility curvature.22 The following table reports the results of a structural estimation using non-linear
least squares.
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE)
Table 4 reports estimates of aggregate annual discount rate, present bias parameter, and utility cur-
vature for each group. The first column of Table 4 reports estimates from the full sample of 59 subjects,
20In some of the columns, self-reported risk taking is associated with less patience, significant at 5% level. Also, the
participants who knew other participants within the same session or in the previous session were less patient, significant at 10%
level. Consistent with previous literature (e.g.,Coller and Williams, 1999, Chabris et al., 2008, Dohmen et al., 2011), being a
female or non-smoker is associated with more patient choices, but in our case not statistically significant.
21In one of the columns, hard-earned group subjects who track expenses is associated with less patient choice, significant at
10% level. Please see Table A4 in the appendix for the detail.
22Unlike more commonly used procedures such as Coller & Williams (1999), we used Andreoni-Sprenger procedure. The
problem with Coller & Willams (1999) is the assumption of linear utility, which could bias the estimated discount rate upwards
with concave utility. Andersen et al., (2008) propose a joint estimation strategy to control for utility curvature, but requires two
separate tasks; one for curvature and one for discount rate, to estimate the discount rate. Rather than requiring two separate
tasks, the Andreoni-Sprenger procedure estimates parameters from a single task.
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using non-linear least squares.23 The results confirm a significant source of income effect in aggregate
intertemporal choices. The subjects in the hard-earned money group are significantly more patient than
the participants in the windfall money group; the average annual discount rate is 124.2% in the windfall
money group and 38.7% in the hard-earned money group, the difference is 85.5% which is statistically
significant.24 Contrary to Andreoni & Sprenger (2012) and Andreoni et al., (2013), but consistent with
e.g., Frederick et al. (2002), we find a statistically significant evidence of present-bias.25 This holds for
both treatment groups (the difference between two groups is insignificant). We can also note that the
aggregate curvature is close to linear in both groups. The utility curvature is 0.861 in the windfall money
group and 0.866 in the hard-earned money group, and the difference between two groups is statistically
insignificant.
The experimental design allowed for four interior solutions to the choice problem, but about 82% of
actual choices are corner solutions. 23 (out of 59) participants have no interior solutions in all 36 budgets.
Treatment assignment has relatively little impact on the probability of choosing interior solutions; the
windfall group makes 76.3% corner choices, and the hard-earned group makes 87.1% corner choices.26
The large fraction of corner choices means that the use of non-linear least squares estimation is
problematic (Andersen et al., 2014). As alternative regression strategy, we also used (1) two-limit Tobit,
and (2) ordered logit. The results are very similar. Column (3) of Table 4 reports the results from two-
limit Tobit, where the subject’s decision is bounded by Option 1 (i.e., zero allocation into the later date)
and Option 6 (i.e., zero allocation into the earlier date).27 We still find a significant source of income
effect. Table A2 reports the marginal effects of earning money on the probability of choosing each option
in each problem set (i.e., each (t, t + k) combination) from ordered logit. The probability of choosing
the earlier date corner solution significantly decreases with the hard-earned money but the probability
of choosing the later date corner solution significantly increases with the hard-earned money, suggesting
higher degree of patience with the hard-earned money.
23Assuming a time-separable quasi-hyperbolic utility functional form, subject’s intertemporal allocation between the two
dates is the solution to the standard utility maximization problem where the demand equation for the later date allocation can
be derived from the first order condition. Following Andreoni et al. (2013), we apply non-linear least squares (NLS) to this
demand function for parameter estimation. See Appendix for full description of estimation strategy.
24The estimated discount factor in the hard money group is similar to that of Andreoni & Sprenger (2012) but lower than
the estimates in Andreoni et al., (2013). The estimated discount rates in the windfall money group is substantially higher than
the estimate of Andreoni & Sprenger (2012) or Andreoni et al., (2013).
25Kuhn et al. (2014) also uses a bank transfer system to pay subjects and find a significant present-bias effect.
26Although the probability of choosing corner solutions in the hard-earned group is higher than that of windfall group, we
cannot conclude that either the hard-earned or windfall group makes noticeably more or less corner choices than what has been
observed in previous literatures. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) obtained 70% corner solutions. In a similar discrete design
to our, Andreoni et al., (2013), obtained 88% corner solutions. The difference in two treatment groups is more prominently
observed in the nature of corner solutions. About 46.4% of total corner solutions was the earlier date corner solutions in the
windfall group, but 74.9% of corner solutions was the later date corner solutions in the hard-earned group.
27For full description of econometric model, please see the Appendix.
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3.3. Surveys
To further substantiate that source of income effects are real, we conducted a survey on the 78 participants
in the risk taking experiment. The survey asked about preferred choice in a series of hypothetical choice
situations involving either a windfall gain or a hard-earned gain. We also included questions that were
designed to elicit source dependency effects on individual social preferences that have been observed in
previous research (Cherry et al., 2002).
(TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE)
Panel A in Table 5 summarizes the results of the survey. Consistent with the experimental results,
the subjects reported being much more likely to make risky and impatient choices if they receive a
windfall (lottery win) than if the same amount of money is hard-earned (part-time job in a grocery store).
For example, a question in the survey asks subjects to choose between a nice dinner in a restaurant or
topping up a travel card. More patient subjects would choose to top-up a travel card. With earned money,
70.5 percent of subjects said they would top-up a travel card but the corresponding number was only
20.5 percent with lottery winnings. The subjects were also more risk-averse with the earned money.
For example, when asked between a cheaper non-refundable and a more expensive refundable holiday
packages, more subjects chose refundable package with the earned money than with the lottery winnings.
We observe a similar pattern in the subsequent questions when the size of the hypothetical budget and the
goods in the question is altered. Consistent with Cherry et al. (2002) we also observe that the subjects
are more generous with the lottery winnings.
The experiment and survey were run on an undergraduate student population. In order to assess
whether source of income effects of the type documented are present in a broader population we ran
a similar survey, online, on 1000 adults from Norway. Panel A in Table 5 summarizes the results of
the survey. One half of these were randomly allocated to the “windfall group” and answered questions
regarding the use of money obtained through a windfall (winning an amount due to being customer
100,000 in a grocery store), and the other half were allocated to the “hard-earned group” and answered
questions regarding the use of funds obtained through a part-time job. We again find strong differences
across the two groups; individuals that were exposed to the windfall “treatment” report more impatient
choices than individuals that were exposed to the hard-work treatment. We observe a similar pattern of
source dependency in different demographic groups such as age, gender, income, region, education, and
the number of children. Thus, as far as we are able to assess, it appears that source of income effects
extend beyond the university undergraduate population.28
28Contrary to the findings in the first survey, we find that windfall subjects are more likely to choose are fundable holiday
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4. Conclusion
4.1. Discussion
The main message of the paper is that source of income matters for investment decisions; money that
are obtained through a windfall gain tends to be invested more riskily and less patiently than money that
is obtained through work. This finding, which appears both strong and robust in the lab environment,
stands in contrast to standard economic theory, where choices can depend on the size of the budget but
the source of the budget should not matter.
There are three main interpretations of our findings. First, our findings can be interpreted as a treat-
ment effect on preferences, i.e., preferences being endogenous and determined by the source of money.29
Alternatively, we can think of preferences as being stable but source-dependent (state-dependent prefer-
ences), as in mental accounting theory.30 Here the “treatment effect” is to shift the consumer into a state
where his preferences are different than in the old state. A third interpretation is that the individuals have
a stable set of preferences, but that treatment can induce investment mistakes.31 Perhaps most plausibly
we can think of choices under the hard earned treatment as better reflecting “true” preferences (if earned
money are closer to real-life experience than windfall money), and choices under the windfall treatment
as reflecting true preferences plus investment mistakes. Under this interpretation, subjects would pre-
sumably have invested more patiently and cautiously with more experience or better education about
investment choices. Our findings do not allow us to distinguish between these three interpretations; our
contribution is to show that source of income affects investment behavior.
A key point in our experimental design has been that participants complete a tedious task at a “salary”
that is generous but not too generous. The motivation for this is that we want to mirror real-life situations
as closely as possible, and avoid that the hard-earned treatment is just a slightly less generous windfall
than the windfall treatment.32 Letting subjects perform a physical, time-consuming task in the lab leads
to interpretational issues. For example, it is possible that part of the differences we find between the hard-
earned and the windfall groups can be explained by fatigue in the hard-earned group. Evidence suggests
that fatigue leads to a “default bias” i.e., a preference for default options (Augenblick & Nicholson, 2015,
package. This could be because a positive effect on the propensity to consume outweighs the increased risk effect.
29Gary Becker is often associated with the view that preferences are stable. But this is not the full picture; Becker (1996)
states that “[..] modern economics has lost a lot by completely abandoning the classical concern with the effects of the economy
on preferences and attitudes” (Becker, 1996, pp. 19-22).
30Our results are also consistent with prospect theory if we assume that hard-earned money increases the reference point
more than windfalls. Our experiment does not really allow for a test of prospect theory, and was not designed as such.
31For example, there is a considerable literature starting with Kagel & Levine (1986) on overbidding in common value
auctions. Overbidding is usually attributed to cognitive errors, not due to changes in preferences.
32The extant literature that uses effort tasks in experimental settings tends to get ambiguous results. For example, Cherry et
al. (2005) find no effect in a public good provision game, while Spraggon & Oxoby (2009) finds a negative effect of work.
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Danziger et al, 2011). We can test for default bias in the risk experiment by investigating whether there
are differences between hard-earned and windfall groups with respect to choosing either cornerpoints or
the middle option of the menu, the presumably most likely default options. We find that the frequency
to which the default option is chosen does not differ between treatment and control groups. In the
intertemporal choice experiment, the subjects in the hard-earned group make more corner solutions than
the windfall group. The majority of corner solutions in the hard-earned group were the later date corner
solutions whereas the majority of corner solutions in the windfall group were the earlier date corner
solutions. It is unclear why default bias should lead to a differnt pattern of corner solutions between the
two groups, and it is not clear to us how to interpret this result. Our results do not appear to be driven by
fatigue in the hard-earned group.
Another possibility is that subjects in the hard-earned group behave differently because they have
spent more time in the lab, and had more opportunity to “settle in” and discover their true preferences.
For example, Plott (1996) proposes a “discovered preference hypothesis”, suggesting that responses in
experiments “reflect a type of internal search process in which subjects use paid practice rounds along
with trial and error to ‘discover’ what their preferences are.” It is unclear to us why settling in should
lead to less risky and more patient choices, and not the reverse, but we cannot exclude the possibility that
discovered preferences can partially explain our results.
4.2. Research implications
Our most important research implication is that investment decisions can depend on the source of the
funds, in addition to the available investment opportunities. This finding could explain, for example,
why the marginal propensity to consume tend to be high for tax cuts; if tax cuts are associated with a
high discount factor then individuals would consume a higher fraction of it than other income.
In future research, one could investigate whether our findings extend to the quality of investment
decisions, i.e., whether individuals tend to make more investment mistakes with windfall money than
with hard-earned money. Investment mistakes is of substantial policy interest in the household finance
area, where numerous findings suggest that the behavior of individual investors differ in several respects
compared to the recommendations of portfolio theory predicts. 33It is possible that some of this erratic
behavior occurs because of effects from making a prior windfall gain, a hypothesis that to our knowledge
has not been tested.
33For example, individual investors tend to sell winners and keep onto losers (Odean, 1998), exhibit a within-industry bias
(Doskeland & Hvide, 2011), and trade too much (Odean, 1999, Barber & Odean, 2000), and tend to behave less than optimally
when refinancing their mortgages (Andersen et al., 2015).
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A limitation of our study is that although we believe mental accounting is useful to understand our
results, we are not aware of formal models of mental accounting that include source of income. For
example, Thaler (2008) contains a formal model which contains some elements of the discussion from
Thaler (1999), but does not include source dependency. It would be of interest for future theoretical
research on mental accounting to accommodate a notion of source dependency, thereby possibly also
refining future empirical tests.
The most important managerial implication of our work is to highlight the psychological tendency to
make investment decisions that depend on source of income. Such behavior, if it translates to managers,
potentially destroys shareholder value, and managers should consider self-testing and debugging their
decision rules to get rid of this tendency.
5. Appendix: Econometric methods
This Appendix describes the econometric methods used for structural estimation in Table 2 and Table
4. To structurally estimate the degree of risk aversion in Table 2, we adopt the standard procedure of
maximum likelihood approach of Harrison and Rutstrom (2008), as described in Subsection 5.1. For
structural estimation of time-preferences in Column (1) of Table 4, we adopt the least square estimation
approach of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and Andreoni et al. (2013), as described in Subsection 5.2.
In Column (3) of Table 4 we also used two-limit Tobit model as a robustness check, following Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012). Subsection 5.3 provides description of this model.
5.1. Table 2: Structural Estimation of Risk-aversion
To structurally estimate degree of risk aversion, we adopt the procedure of Harrison and Rutstrom (2008).
Assume that the subjects have CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility functional form,
U(x) = x1 r (4)
where r is the coefficient of CRRA. A higher r is associated with higher risk aversion. Furthermore, we
assume that the CRRA coefficient r is determined by the following linear equation,
r^ = r^0 + r^1Ti (5)
where the treatment Ti =1 if hard-earned money, and Ti= 0 if windfall money. Following Holt and
Laury (2002) we used Luce’s (1959) probabilistic ratio to define the latent index rEU , where EUi is
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the expected utility for each option.
rEU = EU
1

Lottery
U
1

Lottery + U
1

Riskless
(6)
The noise parameter  captures any deviation from the expected utility maximization choice. As   ! 0,
the person will always choose the option with higher expected utility. As   ! 1, the probability
converges to 12 , and choice becomes random. This latent index is then linked to the observed choice and
the conditional log-likelihood becomes
lnL(r0; r1; jy) = ln(rEU)jy = lottery) + ln(1 rEU jy = riskless) (7)
We assume that errors are normally distributed, but we relax the assumption that the residuals from the
same subjects are uncorrelated (i.e., we allow correlation between the decision rows within the same
subject), as there are nine observations from each subject. Parameters r0 and r1 are estimated using
maximum likelihood and standard errors are clustered at the subject-level.
5.2. Table 4: Structural Estimation by the Least Squares
For structural estimation of parameters in Column (1) of Table 4, we adopt the nonlinear least squares
estimation following Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). Following Laibson (1997) we assume that the
preferences can be represented by following time-separable quasi-hyperbolic CRRA utility function.
U(xt; xt+kjTi) = x(Ti)t + (Ti)t0(Ti)kx(Ti)t+k (8)
 = 1  r is curvature of utility function, where r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. t0 = 1 if the
early payment date is the day of experiment, and zero otherwise. k is the delay length (i.e., the difference
between early and later payment dates in number of days). We assume that subjects maximize utility
subject to the following intertemporal budget constraint,
xt +
xt+k
p
5 m (9)
where the treatment Ti =1 if hard-earned money, and Ti= 0 if windfall money. To test the treatment we
assume that each parameter has following linear specification. (Ti) is present-bias estimator such that
(Ti) = 0 + 1Ti. (Ti) is discount factor such that (Ti) = 0 + 1Ti and (Ti) is utility curvature
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such that (Ti) = 0 + 1Ti. The first order condition for above utility maximization problem is,
p =
x
(Ti) 1
t
(Ti)t0(Ti)kx
(Ti) 1
t+k
(10)
Replacing xt and rearranging (10), we can derive following non-linear regression equation, where the
dependent variable is the allocation to the later date, xt+k. We assume that each subject j makes i = 1,
2, . . . , 36 allocation decisions.
xt+kij =
m
[p(Ti)t0(Ti)k]
1
(Ti) 1 + 1p
+ ij (11)
We assume that errors are normally distributed, but but we relax the assumption that the residuals from
the same subjects are uncorrelated, i.e., E[ehjeij ] 6= 0 for decisions h 6= i within the same subject j.
The parameters , ,and  are estimated using least squares and the standard errors are clustered at the
subject-level.
5.3. Table 4: Structural Estimation from Two-limit Tobit
In the data, we observe a large fraction of corner solutions. To address potential concerns over a large
fraction of corner solutions (Wooldridge, 2002), in Column (3) of Table 4, we used Two-limit Tobit
model as an alternative estimation strategy following Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). We assume that
each subject j makes i = 1, 2, ..., 36 allocation decisions according to the following log-linear model,
derived from the first order condition (10).34
ln(
xt
xt+k
)ij =
ln
  1  t0 +
ln 
  1  k +
1
  1  ln (P ) + ij (12)
To test treatment effect on , , and , we add three interaction variables, t0 Ti, k Ti, and lnP  Ti,
respectively, where the treatment Ti =1 if hard-earned money, and Ti=0 for windfall money. We assume
that parameter  (Ti),  (Ti), and  (Ti) has linear specification as in subsection 5.2.
ln(
xt
xt+k
)ij = 1  t0 + 2  k + 3  lnP + 4  (t0  Ti) + 5  (k  Ti) + 6  (lnP  Ti) + ij (13)
The dependent variable, i.e., the log-ratio of intertemporal allocation between t, and t + k, is bounded
by ln(xt=0xt+k ) and ln(
xt
xt+k=0
) and therefore, parameters k can be estimated from the two-limit Tobit
34See also Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), pp. 3342, for derivation of the log-linear model.
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regression. Again, we assume that errors are normally distributed, but but we relax the assumption that
the residuals from the same subjects are uncorrelated, i.e., E[ehjeij ] 6= 0 for decisions h 6= i within
the same subject j. The standard errors are clustered at the subject level. For the windfall group, we
can evaluate the present-bias parameter, windfall, as windfall = exp( 13 ), discount factor, windfall, as
windfall = exp(
2
3
), and curvature, windfall, as windfall = 13 + 1, respectively. Likewise, for the
hard-earned group, present-bias parameter, earned, discount factor, earned, and curvature, earned can
be evaluated as, earned = exp( 1+43+6 ), earned = exp(
2+5
3+6
), and earned = 13+6 + 1, respectively.
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Table 1. OLS (Risk-Preferences)  
 
The table reports the relationship between self-reported measures of risk willingness, and socio demographics and the frequency with which 
riskless Option A was chosen (i.e., Switching Point) from an OLS. The table reports coefficient and standard errors in brackets. The dependent 
variable is the frequency with which riskless Option A was chosen. The higher the frequency, the greater the risk-aversion. Earned is a dummy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
        
Earned 1.636*** 1.557*** 1.555*** 1.545*** 1.548*** 1.664*** 1.615*** 
 (0.268) (0.268) (0.273) (0.276) (0.290) (0.302) (0.305) 
Smoking  -0.620 -0.518 -0.481 -0.506 -0.374 -0.286 
  (0.419) (0.438) (0.439) (0.451) (0.502) (0.504) 
Exercise  -0.461* -0.416 -0.362 -0.338 -0.295 -0.197 
  (0.268) (0.276) (0.280) (0.298) (0.318) (0.319) 
Contraception   -0.138 -0.115 -0.124 -0.173 -0.146 
   (0.159) (0.161) (0.173) (0.181) (0.178) 
Drinking   0.0204 0.0734 0.0163 0.103 -0.0329 
   (0.277) (0.284) (0.299) (0.312) (0.327) 
Risk-taking    -0.166 -0.253 -0.311 -0.368* 
    (0.192) (0.210) (0.219) (0.217) 
Trust    -0.231 -0.270 -0.326 -0.401* 
    (0.198) (0.208) (0.222) (0.219) 
Savings A/C     0.0268 -0.180 -0.125 
     (0.325) (0.352) (0.349) 
Regular savers     -0.0182 0.128 0.118 
     (0.390) (0.414) (0.400) 
Lending     -0.121 -0.0870 -0.0746 
     (0.284) (0.303) (0.299) 
Plagiarism     -0.165 -0.184 -0.241 
     (0.316) (0.341) (0.335) 
Cheating     0.287 0.329 0.364 
     (0.463) (0.503) (0.498) 
Postpone     0.492 0.561 0.556* 
     (0.317) (0.343) (0.332) 
Age      0.470 0.352 
      (0.326) (0.321) 
Year      -0.267 -0.180 
      (0.215) (0.213) 
Gender      -0.587 -0.584 
      (0.363) (0.361) 
Course      0.194 -0.0500 
      (0.335) (0.338) 
Employment      -0.0239 0.0574 
      (0.512) (0.513) 
Daily spending      0.112 0.220 
      (0.352) (0.346) 
Others       0.409 
       (0.346) 
Experience       -0.393 
       (0.336) 
Confidence       -1.040* 
       (0.553) 
Constant 4.075*** 4.368*** 4.601*** 5.099*** 5.076*** 5.266*** 5.610*** 
 (0.187) (0.224) (0.405) (0.529) (0.609) (0.735) (0.820) 
        
       N 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Adjusted R-squared 0.320 0.348 0.337 0.338 0.314 0.299 0.347 
 
is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for a participant is in the hard-earned group. Smoking, Exercise, Drinking, Savings A/C, Regular 
savers, Lending, Plagiarism, Cheating, and Postpone are behavioural dummy variables that take on a value of one if a participant is a smoker, 
exercise regularly, drinks at least once a week, has a savings a/c, is a regular saver, often lends money to others, plagiarised university course work 
at least once, has cheated on a university exam at least once, and often postpone duties, respectively. Contraception, Risk-taking, and Trust are the 
self-reported categorical variable that each takes a value from 1 to 3, depending on general degree of each variable. Age, Year (number of years in 
university), Gender, Course, Employment, and Daily spending are socio demographic variables. Age has three categories; older (i.e., age>24), 
middle (i.e., 22≤age≤24), and younger (i.e., age<22). Year (number of years in university) is measured in number of years. Daily spending is the 
binary variable that takes a value of one if subject’s average daily spending (converted to $) is in upper quartile. Gender, Course, and Employment 
is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a participant is male, is in business school course of degrees, and has an employment history 
more than one year, respectively. Others, Experience, and Confidence control for some (possible) experimental noises. Others is a dummy variable 
that takes on a value of one if a participant knew other participants in the previous or same session. Experience is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one if a participant has an experience in participating experiment. Confidence is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a 
participant was not confident in receiving payments as in the instructions. Asterisks next to the coefficients are levels of significance of the 
estimates, denoting * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, and *** = p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Structural estimation of the CRRA coefficient 
 
The table reports the structural estimation of the CRRA coefficient r for each group from Luce’s (1959) choice probabilistic formulation, where 
parameter η estimates the stochastic noise from the perspective of the expected utility maximisation. The standard errors are in brackets and are 
clustered at an individual level. The table also reports the difference between the two groups and the asterisks next to the brackets are levels of 
significance, denoting * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, and *** = p < 0.01. Column (1) reports the estimation from a full sample. Column (2) reports 
the estimation excluding 7 subjects who said in the survey that they were not confident they would receive payments. Column (3) reports the 
estimation excluding 32 subjects who knew other participants in the previous or same session. Column (4) reports the estimation excluding 39 
subjects who have participated in economics experiments before.  
 
       (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  
  Model Model Model Model 
     
CRRA curvature : r     
     Endowed 0.021 0.054    -0.109    -0.001 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
     Earned 0.447 0.461 0.438 0.483 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.094) 
     Difference 0.427 0.407 0.547 0.484 
    (0.08)***    (0.08)***    (0.10)***   (0.12)*** 
     
 
noise parameter : η 
 
 
    0.11  
 
 
0.11 
 
 
0.11 
 
 
0.12 
    (0.01)***    (0.01)***    (0.01)***    (0.02)*** 
     
Observation 702 639 414 351 
Log-likelihood -163.48 -149.90 -96.54 -87.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. OLS (Time-Preferences) 
 
The table reports the relationship between self-reported time-preferences measures and the allocation to the later date from an OLS. More patient 
subjects would make more allocation to the later date. The table reports coefficient and standard errors in brackets. The standard errors are 
clustered at an individual level. Earned is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for a subject in the hard-earned group. Smoking, Exercise, 
and Track are the self-reported measure of behaviour that is related to the individual time-preferences (e.g., Chabris et al., 2008). These are 
dummy variables that each takes on a value of one if individual is a smoker, exercises regularly, and keep records of expenses, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model 
       
Earned 2.441** 2.171** 2.354*** 2.292*** 2.509*** 2.509** 
 (0.920) (0.923) (0.838) (0.816) (0.727) (0.962) 
Smoking  -1.457 -1.046 -0.909 -0.150 -0.150 
  (1.238) (1.275) (1.103) (1.218) (1.467) 
Exercise  -0.539 -0.836 -1.294 -1.020 -1.020 
  (0.932) (1.029) (0.963) (0.966) (1.174) 
Track  -0.124 -0.395 -0.0906 0.760 0.760 
  (0.909) (1.031) (1.072) (1.042) (1.131) 
Risk-taking   -1.111** -1.530** -0.660 -0.660 
   (0.505) (0.642) (0.543) (0.837) 
Patience   -0.545 -0.526 -0.442 -0.442 
   (0.705) (0.679) (0.613) (0.719) 
Temptation   0.205 0.128 0.216 0.216 
   (0.638) (0.572) (0.554) (0.671) 
Trust   0.0150 0.0455 -0.691 -0.691 
   (0.723) (0.621) (0.548) (0.734) 
Present-bias   1.476 1.495 -0.0117 -0.0117 
   (1.347) (1.292) (1.303) (1.473) 
Age    -2.067 -1.214 -1.214 
    (1.303) (1.163) (1.516) 
Year    1.015 0.482 0.482 
    (0.662) (0.621) (0.705) 
Gender    -1.268 -1.129 -1.129 
    (0.945) (0.790) (1.035) 
Employment    -1.360 -1.393 -1.393 
    (1.451) (1.693) (1.733) 
Daily spending    -0.0357 -0.559 -0.559 
    (1.201) (1.065) (1.147) 
Course    0.451 0.985 0.985 
    (0.997) (0.985) (1.134) 
Nationality    -0.0163 -0.295 -0.295 
    (1.101) (0.995) (1.226) 
Others     -1.853* -1.853 
     (1.023) (1.298) 
Reason     -3.674*** -3.674*** 
     (1.119) (1.356) 
Price ratio  19.44*** 19.44*** 19.44*** 19.44***  
  (0.994) (0.995) (0.997) (0.997)  
Constant 7.789*** -18.23*** -15.11*** -14.83*** -14.44*** 12.34*** 
 (0.668) (1.735) (3.400) (3.118) (3.000) (2.967) 
       
Observations 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 59 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.438 0.457 0.480 0.521 0.148 
 
Risk-taking, Patience, Temptation, and Trust are the self-reported variables that each take a value from 1 to 3 depending on the level of 
risk-taking, patience, resisting temptation, and trusting people in general, respectively. Present-Bias is a dummy variable that takes a value of one 
if subjects were present-biased in the hypothetical question. Age, Year (number of years in university), Gender, Employment, Daily spending, 
Course, and Nationality are socio demographic variables. Age has two categories; older (i.e., age≥21), and younger (i.e., age<21). Year (number of 
years in university) is measured in number of years. Daily spending is the binary variable that takes a value of one if subject’s average daily 
spending (measured in £) is in upper quartile. Gender, Employment, Course, and Nationality is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a 
participant is male, has an employment history more than one year, is in business school course of degrees, and is a resident of UK & Ireland, 
respectively. Others and Reason controls for some possible experimental noises. Others is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a 
participant knew other participants in the previous or same session. Reason is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a participant has 
some specific reasons for their choices other than the monetary rewards. Price ratio is the relative price of the later date allocation. Asterisks next 
to the coefficients are levels of significance of the estimates, denoting * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, and *** = p < 0.01. In Column (6), we collect 
one number from each individual, their mean allocation to the later date and reports regression results of this.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Parameter estimation: Non-Linear Squares (NLS)  
 
The table reports the estimated parameters from NLS. Standard errors are in brackets and are clustered on an individual level. Coefficient α = 1 – θ 
is the curvature of the utility function, where θ is the CRRA coefficient. β is the present-bias estimator, where β < 1 is an indication of 
present-bias. Lastly, δ is the discounting factor and r =(1/δ365) − 1 is the annual discounting rate. Column (1) and Column (2) reports estimations 
from the NLS. Column (1) reports estimations from the full sample of 59 subjects. Column (2) reports the results when participation fee of £1.50 
was added to each time period. Column (3) reports the estimation from two-limit Tobit model. Column (4) displays the results in Andreoni and 
Sprenger (2012) and Column (5) displays the results in Andreoni et al. (2013), respectively. The “Difference” reports the difference in the 
estimates between the two groups and asterisks next to the brackets are levels of significance, denoting * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, and *** = p < 
0.01.  
 
Method: NLS   NLS   Tobit   AS (2012)   AKS (2013) 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Annual Disc. Rate 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Endowed 1.242 
	  
1.201 
	  
1.652 
	  
 0.371 
	  
0.679 
	  
(0.225) 
	  
(0.222) 
	  
(0.333) 
	  
(0.091) 
	  
(0.148) 
	    	    	   	   	   	   	   	  Earned 0.387  0.384 	  
0.594   	    
	  
(0.143)  (0.152) 	  
(0.181)   	    
	      	      	    Difference -0.855  -0.816 	  
-1.058   	    
 (0.267)***  (0.267)*** 	  
(0.379)***   	    
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Present bias: β 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Endowed 0.938 
	  
0.940 
	  
0.922 
	  
1.007 
	  
0.988 
	  
(0.019) 
	  
(0.019) 
	  
(0.021) 
	  
(0.006) 
	  
(0.009) 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Earned 0.933 
	  
0.942 
	  
0.939 
	    	    
	  
(0.027) 
	  
(0.027) 
	  
(0.030) 
	    	    
	    	    	    	    	    Difference   -0.005 
	  
0.002 
	  
0.017 
	    	    
 (0.034) 	  
(0.033) 
	  
(0.036) 
	    	    
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  CRRA curvature: α 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Endowed 0.861  0.809  0.988  0.897  0.928 
 (0.183)  (0.020)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
          Earned 0.866  0.802  0.989     
 (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.002)     
    	      	    Difference 0.004    -0.007 	  
0.001   	    
 (0.027)  (0.028) 	  
(0.002)   	     
 
    	      	    
R-Sqr / LL  0.7988  0.7978 	  
-2791.78  0.4871 	  
0.5910 
Observations 2124  2124 	  
2124  4365 	  
1392 
Uncensored -  - 	  
386  - 	  
- 
Clusters 59   59 	  	   59   97 	  	   58 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Survey  
 
The table summarizes the results in the two separate surveys. The first survey (Panel A) was run on the experimental subjects after completing the 
experiment. The second survey (Panel B) was run online, on 1000 adults from Norway. 
  
Panel A. Experimental Subjects 
 
Question 1 
	   	   	   	   	    Alternatives N Chi - Square test 
  (a) Dinner (b) Top-up   χ - square p -value 
Earned 29.5% 70.5% 78   
    39.3 < 0.001 
Lottery 79.5% 20.5% 78   
            
Question 2 
	   	   	   	   	    Alternatives N Chi - Square test 
  (a) Necessity (b) Unnecessary   χ - square p –value 
Earned 69.2% 30.8% 78   
    44.0 < 0.001 
Lottery 16.7% 83.3% 78   
 	   	   	   	   	  Question 3 
	   	   	   	   	    Alternatives N Fischer's Exact test 
  (a) New phone (b) Save   p -value 
Earned 2.6% 97.4% 78   
    < 0.001 
Lottery 33.3% 66.7% 78   
 	   	   	   	   	  Question 4 
	   	   	   	   	    Alternatives N Chi - Square test 
  (a) non refundable (b) refundable   χ - square p –value 
Earned 54.6% 45.5% 78   
    16.2 < 0.001 
Lottery 84.4% 15.6% 78   
 	   	   	   	   	  Question 5 
	   	   	   	   	    Alternatives N t - test 
  Average Donation   t - stat p –value 
Earned 1540 KRW ( = $15.4) 78   
    4.03 <  0.001 
Lottery 5350 KRW ( = $53.5) 78     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. A sample from Norwegian (general) population 
 
 
Question 1 
	   	   	   	   	    Alternatives N Chi - Square test 
  (a) Dinner (b) Save for Holidays   χ - square p –value 
Earned 18% 82% 519   
    104.45 < 0.01 
Lottery 48% 52% 503   
            
Question 2 
	   	   	   	   	    Alternatives N Chi - Square test 
  (a) Necessary (b) Unnecessary   χ - square p –value 
Earned 86% 14% 519   
    105.02 < 0.01 
Lottery 57% 43% 503     
 	   	   	   	   	  Question 3 
	   	   	   	   	    Alternatives N Chi - Square test 
  (a) New phone/Laptop/Tablet (b) Save   χ - square p –value 
Earned 8% 92% 519   
    0.47 0.49 
Lottery 7% 93% 503     
 	   	   	   	   	  Question 4 
	   	   	   	   	    Alternatives N Chi - Square test 
  (a) non refundable (b) refundable   χ - square p –value 
Earned 59% 41% 519   
    49.44 < 0.01 
Lottery 37% 63% 503     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. Summary statistics: averages and mean differences 
 
The table reports averages and mean differences between two groups for the main variables. The table also provides a description for each variable. 
Panel A present average individual characteristics in the risk-preferences (Holt-Laury) experiment, for: the full sample, the hard-earned money 
group, and the windfall money group. Likewise, Panel B present average individual characteristics in the time-preferences (Andreoni-Sprenger) 
experiment, for: the full sample, the hard-earned money group, and the windfall money group. The second-last column reports the mean difference 
between the hard-earned and windfall money group. The last column reports the t-statistics (or z-statistics) for the mean differences and asterisks 
denote level of significance (* = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, and *** = p < 0.01).  
 
Panel A: Risk Preferences
Full sample Hard-earned Windfall
Variable Description Mean Mean Mean Mean Diff t (or z)-stat 
Age Subject's age in years 23.42 23.44 23.4 0.04 0.09
Year University year 2.86 2.95 2.78 0.17 0.65
Gender % of male subjects 56.4% 57.9% 55.0% 2.9% 0.26
Course % of subjects who are on business school related degree courses 34.6% 29.0% 40.0% -11.0%        -1.03
Employment % of subjects with employment history 10.3% 7.9% 12.5% -4.6%        -0.67
Daily Spending average spend per day in KRW ($1 = approx. 1000 KRW) 11750 11670 11830 -160        -0.14
Smoking % of smokers 11.5% 5.3% 17.5% -12.2%        -1.69*
Exercise % of subjects who exercise regularly 39.7% 39.5% 40.0% -0.5%        -0.05
Risk-taking General attitude towards risk on a scale from 1 to 3(3 being the most risk-seeking) 1.59 1.66 1.53 0.13 0.80
Trust General attitude towards trust on a scale from 1 to 3(3 being a lot of trust) 1.45 1.34 1.55 -0.21        -1.33
Other Participants % of subjects who knew other participants in sameor previous sessions 41.0% 29.0% 52.5% -23.5%        -2.11**
Confidence % of subjects who siad they were confident they would receivepayments as described in the instructions 91.0% 97.4% 85.0% 12.4%   1.91*
Understand % of subjects who said instructions were comprehensible 98.7% 97.4% 100% -2.6%        -1.03
Panel B: Time Preferences
Full sample Hard-earned Windfall
Variable Description Mean Mean Mean Mean Diff t (or z)-stat 
Age Subject's age in years 20.9 21.0 20.8 0.2 0.283
Year University year 2.39 2.47 2.31 0.16 0.56
Gender % of male subjects 45.9% 48.4% 43.3% 5.1% 0.397
Course % of subjects who are on business school related degree courses 39.3% 38.7% 40% -1.3%      -0.103
Employment % of subjects with employment history 8.2% 9.7% 6.7% 3.0% 0.428
Daily Spending average spend per day in £ 8.48 8.60 8.37 0.23 0.131
Smoking % of smokers 13.1% 6.45% 20% -13.6%      -1.567
Exercise % of subjects who exercise regularly 68.9% 61.3% 76.7% -15.4%      -1.297
Risk-taking General attitude towards risk on a scale from 1 to 3(3 being the most risk-seeking) 2.19 2.33 2.14 0.19       1.02
Trust General attitude towards trust on a scale from 1 to 3(3 being a lot of trust) 1.66 1.7 1.62 0.08       0.41
Other Participants % of subjects who knew other participants in sameor previous sessions 27.9% 32.3% 23.3% 9.0% 0.778
Confidence % of subjects who siad they were confident they would receivepayments as described in the instructions 96.7% 96.8% 96.7% 0.1% 0.022
Understand % of subjects who said instructions were comprehensible 100% 100% 100% - -
 Continued ...  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Other Variables (Risk Preferences)
Full sample Hard-earned Windfall
Variable Description Mean Mean Mean Mean Diff t (or z)-stat 
Plagiarism % of subjects who have at least once plagiarised coursework 34.6% 34.2% 35.0% -0.08%      -0.07
Cheating % of subjects who have at least once cheated on exam 12.8% 13.2% 12.5% 0.07%       0.09
Postpone % of subjects who said they often postpone duty 66.7% 63.2% 70.0% -6.8%      -0.64
Drinking % of subjects who drink at least once a week 62.8% 55.3% 70.0% -14.7%      -1.22
Contraception Frequency of contraception on a scale from 1 to 3 (3 being always) 1.99 1.92 2.05 -0.13      -0.64
Savings A/C % of subjects with savings a/c 62.8% 71.1% 55.0% 16.1%       1.45
Regular Savings % of subjects who save regularly 19.2% 23.7% 15.0% 8.7%       0.97
Lending % of subjects who often lend money to others 46.2% 39.5% 52.5% -13.0%      -1.15
Experience % of subjects who have participated experiments before 50.0% 55.3% 45.0% 10.3%       0.91
Panel B: Other Variables (Time Preferences)
Full sample Hard-earned Windfall
Variable Description Mean Mean Mean Mean Diff t (or z)-stat 
Track % of subjects who kept records of expenses 20.9 21.0 20.8 0.2 0.14
Patience General level of patience on a scale from 1 to 3(3 being the most patient) 2.19 2.20 2.17 0.03 0.14
Temptation General likelihood to succumb to temptation on a sacle from 1 to 3(3 being the most likely to resist temptation) 2.19 2.23 2.14 0.09  0.91
Prent-Bias % of subjects who were present biased in hypothetical question 14.8% 12.9% 16.7% -3.8%       -0.42
Nationality % of subjects who are based in the UK or Ireland 27.9% 29.0% 26.7% 2.3% 0.21
Concern % of subjects who had some specific reasons for their choices(i.e., decision-making was not salient) 19.7% 19.4% 20.0% -0.6%       -0.06
Table A2. Ordered Logit (Marginal Effects) 
 
The table reports the marginal effects of earning money on the probability of choosing each option Pr(Option ‘i’ = 1) in each problem from the 
ordered logit model, where each problem differ in the earlier date and the later date combination , (t days, t + k days) ∈ {(0, 42), (0, 84), (0, 126), 
(42, 84), (42, 126), (42, 168)}. The standard errors are in brackets and are clustered at an individual level.  Asterisks next to the coefficients are 
levels of significance, denoting * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, and *** = p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   (0, 42 days)    (0, 84 days)   (0, 126 days)   (42, 84 days)  (42, 126 days)  (42, 168 days) 
Choice (Y=Option‘i’)       
       
       
       
Option 1 -0.177*** -0.171** -0.124* -0.174*** -0.191*** -0.187*** 
 (0.0646) (0.0673) (0.0637) (0.0567) (0.0643) (0.0656) 
       
       
Option 2 -0.0146* -0.0135* -0.00620 -0.0251** -0.0174* -0.00599 
 (0.00886) (0.00725) (0.00451) (0.0123) (0.00944) (0.00391) 
       
       
Option 3 -0.0192* -0.0144* -0.00431 -0.0369** -0.0267** -0.00881* 
 (0.00991) (0.00839) (0.00374) (0.0177) (0.0132) (0.00469) 
       
       
Option 4 -0.0105 -0.00524 -0.000295 -0.0172* -0.0147* -0.00394 
 (0.00643) (0.00484) (0.00244) (0.0103) (0.00852) (0.00343) 
       
       
Option 5 -0.00315 -0.000756 0.00102 -0.0118 -0.0111 -0.000868 
 (0.00307) (0.00410) (0.00117) (0.00779) (0.00742) (0.00215) 
       
       
Option 6 0.225*** 0.205** 0.134* 0.265*** 0.261*** 0.207*** 
 (0.0833) (0.0825) (0.0701) (0.0896) (0.0888) (0.0731) 
       
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 354 
Figure 1. The proportion of riskless Option A was chosen at each decision row 
 
The figure below displays the proportion of times Option A was chosen at each decision row for each group. The horizontal axis is the row 
number and vertical axis is the percentage of Option A was chosen. The blue line displays results for the windfall money group and the red line 
displays results for the hard-earned money group. The green line displays theoretical prediction of a risk-neutral individual.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean Allocation (Time-Preferences) 
 
The figure below displays the mean allocation of earned/endowed money to the LATER date against the daily interest rate (in basis points) for 
each group. As expected, subjects increase their allocation to the later date as the interest rate increases. The figure also shows that the mean 
number of allocation to the later date is higher in the hard-earned group than in the windfall group for a given interest rate, suggesting that subjects 
are more patient in the hard work group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3. Heterogeneity of the effect of earning money (Risk choice) 
 
The table reports heterogeneity of the effect of earning money on individual risk choice from OLS. The dependent variable is the frequency with 
which riskless Option A was chosen. In order to observe which individual in the hard-earned group has more or less effect from earing money, we 
consider following interaction terms; Earned × Male is the interaction effect of males in the hard-earned group. Earned × Daily spending is the 
interaction effect of subjects in the hard-earned group whose average daily spending is high (i.e., upper quartile). Earned × Age is the interaction 
effect of subject’s age in the hard-earned group. Earned × Course is the interaction effect of degree of course in the hard-earned group. Earned × 
Risk is the interaction effect of subject’s general risk-taking in the hard-earned group. Earned × Trust is the interaction effect of subject’s general 
level of trust in the hard-earned group. Earned × Drinking is the interaction effect of subject who drinks in the hard-earned group. Earned × 
Exercise is the interaction effect of subject who regularly exercise in the hard-earned group. Earned × Contraception is the interaction effect of 
subject’s frequency of contraception in the hard-earned group. Earned × Regular is the interaction effect of regular savers in the hard-earned group. 
In Column (6), we also include some other demographic variables as in Table 1. The table reports coefficient and standard errors in brackets. 
Asterisks next to the coefficients are levels of significance of the estimates, denoting * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, and *** = p < 0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model 
       
Earned 1.958*** 2.184*** 1.465* 2.297** 2.436* 2.694* 
 (0.403) (0.429) (0.797) (1.024) (1.235) (1.421) 
Gender (=1 if Male) -0.167 -0.192 -0.225 -0.218 -0.186 -0.0913 
 (0.372) (0.371) (0.379) (0.379) (0.394) (0.464) 
Earned × Male -0.549 -0.499 -0.460 -0.348 -0.471 -0.867 
 (0.536) (0.536) (0.564) (0.563) (0.595) (0.628) 
Daily spending (=1 if High)  0.616 0.616 0.641 0.267 0.208 
  (0.403) (0.425) (0.423) (0.484) (0.466) 
Earned × Daily spending  -0.835 -0.786 -0.738 -0.255 -0.0656 
  (0.575) (0.599) (0.595) (0.653) (0.629) 
Age   -0.229 -0.194 0.108 0.497 
   (0.250) (0.258) (0.298) (0.401) 
Earned × Age   0.419 0.511 0.227 0.308 
   (0.350) (0.364) (0.402) (0.433) 
Course   0.255 0.268 0.356 0.470 
   (0.403) (0.406) (0.406) (0.433) 
Earned × Course   -0.531 -0.610 -0.613 -0.868 
   (0.607) (0.612) (0.621) (0.640) 
Risk-taking    -0.190 0.124 -0.206 
    (0.305) (0.328) (0.342) 
Earned × Risk-taking    -0.0975 -0.439 -0.285 
    (0.391) (0.420) (0.432) 
Trust    4.40e-05 0.183 -0.0884 
    (0.250) (0.289) (0.289) 
Earned × Trust    -0.667 -0.990** -0.863* 
    (0.435) (0.487) (0.506) 
Drinking     -0.109 -0.195 
     (0.461) (0.446) 
Earned × Drinking     0.407 0.200 
     (0.624) (0.654) 
Exercise     -0.721 -0.913* 
     (0.488) (0.501) 
Earned × Exercise     0.882 1.417** 
     (0.642) (0.649) 
Contraception     -0.476* -0.236 
     (0.254) (0.273) 
Earned × Contraception     0.375 0.125 
     (0.346) (0.339) 
Regular savers     -0.374 0.0896 
     (0.623) (0.627) 
Earned × Regular savers     0.132 -0.396 
     (0.791) (0.801) 
 Continued on next page   
 Continued from previous page   
Year      -0.252 
      (0.219) 
Smoking      -0.291 
      (0.558) 
Employment      0.0485 
      (0.495) 
Plagiarism      -0.480 
      (0.365) 
Cheating      -0.0946 
      (0.488) 
Postpone      0.720** 
      (0.322) 
Others      0.709** 
      (0.348) 
Confidence      -0.906 
      (0.593) 
Experience      -0.249 
      (0.359) 
Constant 4.167*** 3.995*** 4.381*** 4.582*** 4.656*** 4.575*** 
 (0.276) (0.297) (0.572) (0.717) (0.878) (1.118) 
       
              N 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Adjusted R-squared 0.334 0.340 0.320 0.339 0.349 0.439 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4. Heterogeneity of the effect of earning money (Intertemporal choice) 
 
The table reports heterogeneity of the effect of earning money on individual intertemporal choice from OLS. The dependent variable is the 
allocation to the later date. In order to observe which individuals in the hard-earned group has more or less effect from earing money, we consider 
following interaction terms; Earned × Male is the interaction effect of males in the hard-earned group. Earned × Daily spending is the interaction 
effect of subjects in the hard-earned group whose average daily spending is high (i.e., upper quartile). Earned × Age is the interaction effect of 
subject’s age in the hard-earned group. Earned × Course is the interaction effect of degree of course in the hard-earned group. Earned × Patience is 
the interaction effect of subject’s general degree of patience in the hard-earned group. Earned × Temptation is the interaction effect of subject’s 
general level of resisting temptation in the hard-earned group. Earned × Trust is the interaction effect of subject’s general level of trust in the 
hard-earned group. Earned × Track is the interaction effect of subject who track expenses in the hard-earned group. Earned × Exercise is the 
interaction effect of subject who regularly exercise in the hard-earned group. In Column (6), we also include some other demographic variables as 
in Table 3. The table reports coefficient and standard errors in brackets, where standard errors are clustered at individual level. Asterisks next to 
the coefficients are levels of significance of the estimates, denoting * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, and *** = p < 0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model 
       
Earned 2.514*** 2.161** 4.048*** 4.952 5.352 6.054 
 (0.944) (0.976) (1.307) (5.005) (4.414) (3.727) 
Gender (=1 if Male) -1.550 -1.481 -1.556 -1.681 -1.125 0.553 
 (1.359) (1.387) (1.385) (1.415) (1.744) (1.678) 
Earned × Male 0.0141 -0.0683 -0.698 -0.645 -1.260 -2.268 
 (1.837) (1.859) (1.851) (1.895) (2.163) (1.962) 
Daily spending (=1 if High)  -0.964 -2.239 -2.183 -2.343 -2.550** 
  (1.452) (1.504) (1.520) (1.431) (1.244) 
Earned × Daily spending  1.157 2.915 2.815 2.926 2.542 
  (2.056) (2.082) (2.034) (1.987) (1.922) 
Age   -0.423 -0.734 -1.319 -3.237* 
   (1.381) (1.379) (1.469) (1.715) 
Earned × Age   -0.287 0.108 0.799 3.489* 
   (1.838) (1.755) (1.808) (1.976) 
Course   3.106** 3.609** 3.601** 4.109*** 
   (1.338) (1.417) (1.371) (1.299) 
Earned × Course   -5.125*** -5.932*** -5.953*** -4.531*** 
   (1.858) (1.843) (1.886) (1.627) 
Patience    0.0736 0.0541 0.0700 
    (0.977) (0.898) (1.004) 
Earned × Patience    -0.845 -1.134 -1.933 
    (1.294) (1.213) (1.245) 
Temptation    0.246 0.539 0.401 
    (0.718) (0.878) (0.934) 
Earned × Temptation    -0.454 -0.636 -0.199 
    (1.008) (1.153) (1.256) 
Trust    -1.153* -1.029 -1.591* 
    (0.684) (0.823) (0.942) 
Earned × Trust    1.281 1.009 0.219 
    (1.080) (1.130) (1.149) 
Track     -0.486 2.031 
     (1.160) (1.329) 
Earned × Track     -0.382 -3.271* 
     (1.652) (1.682) 
Exercise     -1.465 -3.745* 
     (1.894) (2.008) 
Earned × Exercise     1.573 3.841 
     (2.255) (2.342) 
Year      0.0835 
      (0.624) 
Smoking      -0.412 
      (1.380) 
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Employment      -0.836 
      (1.537) 
       
Present-bias      -0.195 
      (1.307) 
Risk-taking      -0.142 
      (0.658) 
Nationality      -0.131 
      (0.924) 
Others      -2.545** 
      (0.994) 
Reason      -4.608*** 
      (1.180) 
Price ratio 19.44*** 19.44*** 19.44*** 19.44*** 19.44*** 19.44*** 
 (0.994) (0.994) (0.995) (0.997) (0.998) (0.999) 
Constant -18.30*** -18.00*** -18.61*** -17.45*** -16.80*** -13.27*** 
 (1.470) (1.563) (1.508) (3.239) (2.964) (2.689) 
       
   Observations 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 
Adjusted R-squared 0.444 0.446 0.475 0.487 0.490 0.565 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
